Tag Archives: Coup

The Grave Situation in South Sudan – Updated

This is the most up to date information, we have as of Jan. 6, 2014 at 8:15 am Central Time.

  1. (Jan. 6) Pres. Omar Bashir of Sudan is meeting with Pres. Salva Kiir of South Sudan in Juba today to discuss the crisis.
  2. (Jan. 5) The Government of South Sudan is fighting to retake Bor from the rebels.
  3. (Jan. 5) A General in the South Sudan Army, Abraham Jongroor Deng, was killed in an ambush.
  4. (Jan 5.) Peace negotiations are scheduled to begin today with the sole agenda item of ending hostilities. The rebels are refusing to come to the table until the leaders arrested on December 16 are freed and allowed to come to the talks.
  5. (Jan. 5) Report of fighting ongoing in Unity State.
  6. (Jan. 4-5) Reports of gunfire or even “heavy fighting” occurring at points during the evening and night in or near military barracks in the capitol, Juba, and in Yei, a town on the Ugandan border. No reliable information is available as to the nature or extent of the gunfire or fighting. There is an unconfirmed report that soldiers in Yei may have defected to the rebel side (@ougasam).
  7. (Jan. 3) The US has evacuated most embassy personnel from Juba.
  8. (Jan 3) Reports are that the South Sudan Army was ambushed on the way to Bor suffering significant casualties. Riek Machar stated that the rebels will reach Juba soon.
  9. The South Sudan Army will again attempt to retake Bor and confront the White Army there instead of Juba.
  10. If the White Army wins in Bor, Juba may be attacked soon afterwards. The distance is not far.
  11. If the White Army fails in Bor it will be because thousands have been killed.
  12. If Juba is attacked, many more thousands will be killed.
  13. Uganda will become involved much more substantially if the threat against Juba increases. Right now Uganda is largely on the sideline. Museveni will not allow Juba to fall without engaging in the fight and using the full weight of his military including air power.
  14. This conflict seems to have begun with a power struggle within the leadership of the SPLM.
  15. Whether or not there was a coup in process at the start of this conflict (Riek Machar denies it), there is now an insurrection involving several military leaders and demands for the ouster of the President under threat of violence at the hands of the military. By definition there is currently a coup attempt in process, though the scope of this event makes that term irrelevant. This is on the scale of a civil war involving thousands, if not tens of thousands, of soldiers on both sides. East African leaders will not accept a coup in South Sudan.
  16. Riek Machar has said that he only wants to run in the next elections. However, at this point, he is leading a rebel group seeking to take over the country.
  17. Several leading figures of the SPLM are currently being held under arrest including former party leader Pagan Amum.
  18. No oil will flow from South Sudan until the conflict ends and foreign workers can return to work.
  19. Unmanned wells will deteriorate rapidly and require significant reconstruction before long, resulting in a major delay, perhaps months long, for the renewal of the oil flow and costing the nation billions of dollars in revenue resulting in a certain economic crisis following even an immediate end to this crisis and a worsening one the longer it continues.
  20. The only possibility of democracy returning to South Sudan in the near future: i.e. months, not weeks, would be for the sides to agree to a cease fire soon. The longer this conflict goes on and the more people die, the worse the animosity will be afterwards and the more difficulty it will be to work together in a democratic nation.
  21. Ethnic based killings and other human rights violations have occurred.
  22. The refugee situation in South Sudan is extreme with tens of thousands of people displaced and existing refugee camps in areas of conflict.
  23. Peace talks in Ethiopia have just begun. Failure of the peace talks will have catastrophic consequences.
You may be interested in reading Dr. Eric Reeve’s extensive analyses exploring the issues: Riek Machar’s possible end game and asking whether or not South Sudan has passed the tipping point.

A Bad Day for the Khartoum Regime

This morning began with the report that Sudanese Minister of Finance Ali Mahmoud told members of the Sudanese parliament that the austerity measures being put in place including the ending of fuel subsidies were a reflection of the “bankruptcy” of the state. With food prices inflating at a rate of 30% and falling currency values along with the real fact that more than 75% of its oil revenues are now gone, the prospects for the future of the Sudanese economy are grim.

The National Consensus Forces (NCF), the major opposition party to Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP), is organizing protests against the removal of the fuel subsidies and is calling for “regime change.” The NCF was joined by the Popular Congress Party (PCP) in protesting and calling for change. Hassan Al-Turabi, leader of the Popular Congress Party, reportedly said that the recent gathering of the NCF and PCP argued that the “meeting should be the kick-off a campaign to confront the regime which continues to oppress the people, stressing that the current economic crisis affects the rich and poor alike.” Al-Turabi said:

The middle class began to recede after the intensification of poverty and inflation. Therefore the opposition leaders met to plan for the after this regime.

Meanwhile, South Sudan is finalizing a deal to create an oil pipeline through Kenya that will result in a major financial loss, oil transit fees, going forward for Khatoum as well as the securing of South Sudan’s future oil income through a friendly nation.

Finally, the Egyptian military has staged what appears to be a coup d’etat in Egypt, removing the Khartoum regime friendly Muslim Brotherhood from power and suddenly putting a major wrench into Bashir’s attempt to unite the newly Islamist run states of Libya and Egypt with his own regime. The linchpin has suddenly been removed and the scheme is mid-collapse.

At this point, unless the Khartoum regime can negotiate peace with both the South Sudanese and the Sudan Revolutionary Forces, limiting its financial expenses for its war efforts and restoring a full flow of oil, it faces the real possibility of complete collapse in the months ahead.